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Kristina Lewin 
Neuroscience 201 
“I am assuming that if we understand the brain, then we will understand the 
nature of knowledge […] and we will understand the nature of 
consciousness” Patricia Churchland (1). 
 
 Patricia Churchland is a pioneer in the fields of neuroscience and philosophy. Describing 
herself as a neurophilosopher (8), her assiduous work has been dedicated to the creation of a 
continuum between the two disciplines. She currently works as a philosophy professor at the 
University of California, San Diego. However, her research straddles the intersection between 
neuroscience and philosophy quite equally, as is evidenced by her many publications. Spanning 
more than four decades, her writings attempt to apply the science of the brain to the unknown 
and indescribable nature of the philosophical self (e.g. identity and morality) (8). Churchland 
suggests that a tangible idea of consciousness, morality and reason exist and when we better 
understand the brain, we will be able to perceive exactly what makes us who we are.  
 Churchland teaches numerous courses in philosophy at U.C. San Diego, including 
“Morality and the Social Brain” and “Ethics and Society”. Additionally, she offers courses that 
highlight her research focus of neurophilosophy, such as “Science and Morality”. She has won a 
number of awards and grants, including the National Science Foundation Grant in 1987 and the 
MacArthur Foundation Research Fellow from 1991 to 1996. She has participated in many 
professional societies for neuroscience and philosophy, as well as holding several office 
positions within said societies. Examples include residing as president over the Society for 
Philosophy from 1984 to 1985 and serving as chair for the executive board of the Institute for 
Neural Computation (UCSD) in 1994. Her curriculum vita is obviously impressive, but even 
more so considering that her official education does not exceed a Master’s degree nor does it 
include formal study in neuroscience (8).  
 Interestingly, much of Churchland’s early writing serves as theory or predictions of what 
may come to be in the field of neuroscience. As she began her research in the 1970s, the science 
of the brain was still largely unknown. Neuroscience continues to develop, but we still do not 
have concrete physical evidence of where consciousness is formed. Even now, her research 
strives to cultivate open-mindedness among her readers and fellow philosophers, through the 
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relaying of studies she believes illustrate the mind-brain connection. In an earlier work entitled, 
“A Perspective on Mind-Brain Research”, Churchland describes what she sees as the contention 
of philosophers to accept cognitive explanation (6). She suggest that her colleagues are either 
“principled non-believers” in that they are unable to accept that the study of the brain has 
anything to offer the study of the self, or are “boggled non-believers” in that they are so 
overwhelmed by the massive amount of information to be uncovered from neurons that they 
assume connections are too far off to begin thinking about now (6).  
 Later publications attempt to connect the disciplines by suggesting questions for 
neuroscientists that could provide relevant and belief-modifying answers for these headstrong 
philosophers. One such question being, “[h]ow do structural arrangements in neural tissue 
embody knowledge?” (4). There is a huge gap that exists between what is innate and what is 
experienced. Churchland insists that these categories are neither “exclusive” nor “exhaustive” (4) 
and to error in that assertion, is to ignore a much larger explanation. Here she indicates that it 
will take a combination of many disciplines to truly understand the mind-brain connection. Not 
only will we rely on neuroscience and philosophy, but also biology and psychology will be 
necessary to attain a true understanding of human nature and consciousness. She insightfully 
states, “differences do not sort themselves into archaic ‘nature’ versus ‘nurture’ bins, and that 
genes and extragenetic factors collaborate in a complex interdependency” (5). 
 In another thought-provoking piece, Churchland tackles free will and its relation to 
neuroscience (2). This is particularly interesting because she offers her opinion on a question 
posed by many curious observers: if our genetics make up our brains and our brains control our 
actions, then are we really responsible for the outcome? Can we blame a pedophile or a thief for 
simply acting on the impulses of his/her consciousness? How do we punish such actions if 
individuals are merely carrying out their hard-wired desires? Her answer is both astute and 
relative to societal living. She suggests that lack of control does not constitute a free pass; it 
merely indicates that individuals without said control must be efficiently treated (e.g. medication 
or therapy) or held outside of the boundaries of the society that does not allow such behavior 
(e.g. in prison), so as not to impart such actions on the society that deems them unacceptable. 
She indicates that “explanation is [not] tantamount to an excuse,” (2) to illustrate her point that 
we must still be held responsible for our actions in order to participate in a functioning society. 
This necessity is based on the requirement of mutual trust built into communal engagement. 
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Learning more about the connection between self and the brain might allow for more effective 
treatments to be created. However, she does point out that the possible downside to this approach 
is that we open the door to “treating” eccentricities or quirkiness (2).  
 New information in neurological research has influenced recent works by Churchland 
where she investigates causal relationships of the brain and “determination, resolve and will” (3). 
She looks at experiments that stimulate portions of the brain electrically to elicit specific 
reactions. Neuroscientists are able to provoke fear, anxiety, and determination simply through 
electronic stimulation. The exact same regions in the brain that are stimulated as a result of an 
experience can be manipulated manually, indicating that the reason we act in certain ways can be 
explained simply by our network of neurons. She goes on to discuss other electrical impulse 
experiments that create experiences regarded as consciousness, such as a distortion of faces but 
not other visual inputs (3). These examples serve to illustrate how consciousness may someday 
be fully explained by a better understanding the brain.  
 Patricia Churchland is a remarkable woman, an inspirational figure for other women, as 
well as scientists and scholars alike. She works and writes as a philosopher, but does not shy 
away from pointing out some of the problems inherent in the discipline. While readers can 
anticipate that her assertions will generally side with the explanations of neuroscience, she poses 
intriguing questions that deal with our notions of the philosophical self. Although the progression 
of her publications indicate a shift in her belief that everything will be explained by science 
eventually to an awareness that the complex networks of our brains may never be fully 
understood, she still holds fast to the idea that there is more to consciousness than an abstract 
idea.  
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